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SHAPING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS*
RALPH

M. HOYT

Whether we like it or not as members of the general public, more
and more of our 'business activities are being brought under the control
and regulation of 'boards, commissions and bureaus. And whether we
like it or not as lawyers, more and more of our practice is before these
same 'boards, commissions and bureaus. We cannot safely advise a
client upon any new business plan without giving careful thought to the
regulatory and tax laws that will confront him.
The State of Wisconsin is one of the pioneers in the establishment
of administrative agencies for the regulation of business. Thirty years
ago this summer there was put into effect in that state one of the first
public utility laws in the country, and four years later we entered the
then untried fields of workmen's compensation and income taxes. just
six years ago we adopted with some trepidation the innovation of unemployment compensation, wondering how our manufacturers would
be able to compete with those in other states who had no such expense
to meet. Since then, however, under the impetus of the federal social
security program, we have seen the majority of the states, including
North Carolina, fall into line with the adoption of substantially similar
measures for the relief of the unemployed.
In the meantime the regulation of every conceivable kind of business
and profession has proceeded apace in all parts of the country, and as
we examine the regulatory acts we are struck with the ingenuity that
has been disclosed in uncovering new occupations to regulate. In Wisconsin the latest discovery, by the legislature of 1937, is that the peace
and prosperity of the state will be conserved by examining and licensing
watchmakers, and so a commission has been created for that purpose.
Here in North Carolina you have covered all the usual subjects of
regulation, from accountants and architects through electrical contractors and embalmers to realtors and surveyors. You 'have found some
businesses needing regulation that I blush to admit we have not yet
thought of in the progressive state of Wisconsin; for instance, dry
cleaners, tile layers and photographers.
The serious thing about this avalanche of regulatory activity is not,
of course, its effect on the practicing attorney, who must increasingly
shift his attention from the common law courts to the boards and commissions, but the tendency to place the rights, privileges and even the
* Address delivered .by Mr. Ibyt of the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Bar at the N. C.
State Bar meeting in Raleigh, N. C., Oct. 22, 1937.
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liberties of the citizen in the hands of non-judicial bodies, politically
appointed and often politically controlled.
It is a vital thing to the citizen who wants to engage in a business
and finds that he is denied permission, or to a corporation which wants
to issue securities and is told that it cannot, to know whether the fiat
of the administrative body is final or practically final, or whether there
is somewhere a right of re-examination and review. And so it comes
about that thoughtful lawyers are giving much attention to the question
of the judicial review of adminstrative decisions.
Where do we go from the commissions? From many of them we
go nowhere. We accept what they decide and like it. In an examination of the statutes governing forty-six administrative -bodies that are
now functioning in North Carolina-which I believe is a fairly complete list-I find only fifteen instances in which any right of review is
mentioned in the statute. Of course we all know that if an administrative body acts wholly beyond its jurisdiction, or commits a pure error
of law, there is always a way to get into court through the common law
writ of certiorari or by injunction or otherwise ;1 but what I am referring to is not the right to keep the board within its jurisdiction, but the
right to test the correctness of its decision where it has complied with all
the forms of law.
The most thorough provision that I have found in the North Carolina statutes for review of the decisions of an administrative body is in
the case of the utilities commissioner. 2 From his orders, appeals may
be taken to the superior court on questions of fact, and to the judge of
the superior court on questions of law, with the right of further appeal
to the supreme court. The superior court having jurisdiction is the one
sitting in the district where the utility company operates or the aggrieved
party resides. The trial is de nova, in the same manner as any civil
action, except that the decision of the commissioner is to be taken as
prima facie just and reasonable. Your supreme court has held that this
means a jury trial, and that any relevant evidence may be introduced,
whether previously presented to the commissioner or not.3 Your supreme court also held, in passing upon a former medical examination
law not now in force, that where these administrative statutes simply
confer a "right of appeal" in. general terms, without specifying what
method of review, the parties have a right to a jury trial. 4 This type of
'McCullough v. Scott, 182 N. C. 865, 109 S. E. 789 (1921) (When quasijudicial officers exceed their jurisdiction or abuse their discretion they are subject
to review by the courts).

IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§1097, 1098.
'State ex rel. Corp. Comm. v Seaboard A. L. and Southern Ry., 161 N. C.
270, 76 S. E. 554 (1912).
' State ex rel. Board of Medical Examiners v. Carroll, 194 N. C. 37, 138 S. E.
339 (1927).
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review, embodying a complete trial de novo and the substitution of an
ordinary jury's verdict for the determination of a body supposed to be
specially versed in the intricacies of the subject, represents one extreme
in the review of administrative determinations.
The other extreme is represented by your Workmen's Compensation
Act, under which the commission's decision is made absolutely conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact, and a review is givenin the superior court of the county where the accident happened-only
upon questions of law. 5 Your supreme court has tempered the severity
of this rule to the extent of holding that where the very jurisdiction of
the commission depends on a finding of fact-as, for instance, the finding that the employer had a sufficient number of employees to come under
the act-the court may review that finding of fact as well as conclusions
of law. 6
The same very meager review, on questions of law only, is provided
in your new Unemployment Insurance Law, enacted in 1937. In this
case the review is in the superior court of the county where the employee
7
resides.
Aside from the instances I have mentioned-public utilities, workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance-the provisions for
review of administrative determinations in North Carolina are meager.
In certain types of cases decided by the board of commissioners of navigation and pilotage an appeal may be taken to the superior court and
disposed of as in the case of an appeal from a justice of the peace.8
Revocations of licenses 'by the insurance commissioner are made "subject to review by any judge of the superior court of Wake County on
appeal," with nothing provided as to the method or scope of the review.9
Presumably the express mention of the judge excludes jury trial in this
instance. A barber' 0 or cosmetician" or real estate broker' 2 whose
license is revoked is given an appeal to the superior court, which "may
in its discretion reverse or modify" the order of revocation. From the
revocation of the license of a dentist, appeal may be taken to the superior
court of the county where the board held its hearing, and the review is
upon the record made before the board, in the same manner as in the
case of a consent reference. 13 In the case of plumbers' 4 and phoIN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081 (ppp).
'Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N. C. 500, 163 S. E. 569 (1932).
N. C. Pub. Laws 1937 c. 1.
C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6943 (k).
IN.
9
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§6299, 6300.
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §5003 (t).
u N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§5259 (26, 27).

" N. C. Pub. Laws 1937. c. 292.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6649 (20).
*' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §5168 (yy).
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tographers 15 the statute contains a rather cryptic provision to the effect
that if a license is revoked nothing in the act shall prevent an appeal to
the superior court, which presumably means that the appellant gets a
7
10
jury trial. Similarly, in the case of dry cleaners and tile layers'
any person aggrieved .by action of the board is given, in general language, a right of appeal to the superior court. In cases of disbarment
of attorneys, as is to be expected in a law thoughtfully drafted by
lawyers themselves, there is explicit provision as to the right and
method of review. There is an appeal as of right to the superior court
of the county where the attorney resides, upon the record made before
the state bar counsel or its committee, with right of jury trial and with
further appeal to the supreme court, the procedure 'being the same as
in the case of a reference ,by consent.' 8
The foregoing are all the provisions I have found in your administrative statutes with reference to court review. In the case of some of
the most important administrative bodies there is, 'by express provision
of the statute, no right of review at all; for example, the revocation of a
physician's license by the board of medical examiners is made final and
conclusive by the statute itself,' 9 and the same is true of the decisions
of the advisory commission which passes on orders of the commissioner
of banks and banking. 20 In the rest of the administrative statutes of
your state, the matter of review is passed over in silence, and this is
true in such important instances as the administration of the Pure Food
Law and the numerous licensing activities of the board of agriculture,
the almost innumerable licenses issued by the commissioner of revenue,
the work of the various boards which examine architects, nurses, pharmacists, optometrists, and so on ad infinitum.
The situation in this regard is little different in North Carolina from
the situation in Wisconsin, and probably in most of the states. The
question of court review has been considerably neglected in the framing
of administrative statutes. Perhaps little harm has been done, so long
as the statutes do provide methods of review in the larger, fields such
as the regulation of public utilities, securities, etc. But the field of
regulatory activity is growing so rapidly-having been extended to no
less than eight new lines of business in North Carolina in this year of
1937-that it would seem high time for the development of a fairly
uniform, just and scientific method of judicial review for all these
administrative activities. It is certainly an orderly and lawyer-like
I5N.
I N.
1 N.
IN.
"N.
IN.

C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7007 (23).
C. Pub. Laws 1937 c. 86.
C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §215 (11).
C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6618.
C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §221 (o).

C. Pub. Laws 1937 c. 30.
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thing to do, and we all know that occasions do, and will in the future,
arise when the lack of adequate review results in serious injustice.
I hasten to add that Wisconsin has not solved the problem 'by any
means. We have adopted the habit, in the enactment of regulatory
laws, of concentrating practically all the review in the circuit court of
the county in which the state capital is located, with appeal from that
court to the supreme court of the state. That method has the advantage
of requiring only two judges to educate themselves in the intricacies of
administrative law instead of scattering the process among two or three
dozen judges throughout the state. It has the disadvantage of requiring
all aggrieved parties or their attorneys to journey to the state capital
and take their place on a crowded calendar. It also has the theoretical
disadvantage of violating a time-honored principle of government by
subjecting the citizen of one county to the decisions of a judge of
another county where he has no right of suffrage. Thus the people of
Milwaukee, a city ten times as large as the next largest city in the state
and with metropolitan problems not easily appreciated in a more rural
setting, must submit all their administrative appeals to a judge whom
they have no -partin selecting, in a county whose total population would
fill up not more than half a dozen wards of the metropolis.
We have not arrived at a solution of the problem of administrative
review in Wisconsin, but our state bar association is working toward it.
We are proposing the establishment of an administrative court of statewide jurisdiction, composed of three judges who will sit either singly
or en banc in various cities of the state, with exclusive jurisdiction to
review the determinations of all state boards, commissions and departments under a procedure made as nearly uniform as practicable. Due
to the iron-clad limitations of our ninety year old state constitution, we
cannot get this court without a constitutional amendment, and that
takes several years in Wisconsin. We feel, however, that if such a court
can be set up, the problem of administrative review will be well taken
care of for a long time to come. We also propose that the decisions of
this administrative court shall be final on certain subjects, and subject
to review by the supreme court only in a limited type of cases; perhaps
only on questions of law and of jurisdictional fact. This will serve the
double purpose of relieving an excessive load upon our supreme court,
and vesting the new court with a dignity and importance that will attract
able men to its bench. The ambulatory feature of the court will enable
the people to obtain justice near home without traveling to the state
capital, and the statewide character of the representation upon the court
will avoid the present objections to the concentration of review in the
judges of a single county.
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There are two very important questions to be faced, however, in
connection with setting up such a court. One is the manner of selecting
its judges, and the other is the scope of the review to be provided.
As to the selection of judges, we are going to have great difficulty
in Wisconsin getting away from the time-honored idea of an elective
judiciary, but I think we must do that if the court is to have a proper
start. Without disparaging the ability of the people to select, by popular
vote, judges of good average qualifications for the common law courts, it
would seem that for a court of the specialized character that we are
planning it is quite essential that some appointive method be used. In
a popular election, the prospect of service on such a bench would excite
the ambition of many a lawyer whose only qualification would be an
ability to make large promises and garner votes, and it would be most
unfortunate if the first three judges of such a court should be men of
that type. So it would seem that some safeguarded method of appointment-such, for instance, as nomination 'by a judicial council containing
representatives of the law schools, the bar association, and the supreme
and circuit courts-would be the ideal plan, and it is toward this end
that we are working in Wisconsin.
Secondly, as to the scope of the review, we find ourselves in a
situation of much controversy. In Wisconsin as in North Carolina,
decisions of the public service commission are subject to trial de novo in
court (though we do not have the jury trial that you have), and decisions under the Workmen's Compensation Act are subject to no review whatever upon the facts. Both extremes are undesirable, and a
middle ground should be found. In Wisconsin we have just recently
had the spectacle of a long trial in the circuit court on the question of
statewide telephone rates, upon appeal from a decision of the public
service commission which was several years in the making. The presentation of the case before the commission itself ran into 13,000 pages of
testimony and 567 exhibits, and I do not know how many more volumes
of testimony and exhibits were presented in the circuit court. Such
duplication of effort should certainly be avoided. On the other hand,
review on questions of law alone leaves the administrative body almost
supreme and free from control. It is not often that an astute administrator is unable to find somewhere in the evidence a bit of testimony
on which to hang a finding, however greatly the evidence may preponderate against it. In a workmefi's compensation case, for instance,
if half a dozen physicians of high standing, supported by x-ray and
laboratory findings, testify positively that a worker is not afflicted with
an occupational disease, and a single physician of shady reputation and
no scientific attainment ventures the opinion that the man does have
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such disease, the commission's finding of the existence of the disease
cannot be disturbed; yet we all know it ought to be reversed. There
should be a review of arbitrary or capricious findings, even though supported by some shred of evidence.
This brings me to a brief discussion of the work that has recently
:been' done in the national field on this subject of administrative review.
On this question of the scope of the review the recent convention of the
American Bar Association witnessed a contest. I had the pleasure
during the past year of serving upon the American Bar Association's
special committee on administrative law. We were commissioned to
work out and present to the association for approval a proposed bill
setting up machinery for the review of administrative determinations in
the federal government. When one approaches that subject in the federal field, the vastness of the job is appalling. Departments, bureaus,
commissions and individual officers are grinding out an untold number
of administrative decisions every day and in all parts of the United
States, and the opportunity for review of those decisions at present is
exceedingly slight. Our committee, after thorough consideration, prepared and presented to the Kansas City convention of the association
last month a bill based on the theory that the administrative process
has become a necessary and permanent part of the machinery of government; that the courts cannot be expected to do administrative work;
that the findings and determinations of administrative officers are entitled to weight and standing, but should not be beyond control; and
that the most feasible method of providing for review in the federal
field is to take the testimony and exhibits as produced before the department or board as the finil record in the case, and submit that record to
the scrutiny of a constitutional court for errors of law and flagrant
errors of fact. We rejected both the idea of review on questions of law
alone, and of a complete retrial of the facts, but instead provided in
our bill that the administrative findings of fact should stand unless
unsupported by evidence or unless arbitrary or capricious. Those words
"arbitrary or capricious" were intended to give the court an opportunity
to look into the record if there was something seriously wrong with the
findings of fact, without requiring the court to weigh the evidence for
a mere preponderance. We were roundly criticized by those of a certain school for giving any review at all upon the facts, and we were
equally scolded -by those of the opposite school for failing to provide a
complete retrial upon questions of fact. Upon presentation of our report to the House of Delegates just three weeks ago, the matter was
thoroughly debated and our bill received the approval of the House by
the close vote of 55 to 51. Next year's committee, therefore, is under
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mandate to proceed with the final drafting of the bill, subject to the
approval of the 'board of governors of the association, and in due course
it presumably will reach the halls of Congress for public discussion.
Last year the Boston convention of the American Bar Association
turned down a proposal for the creation of a large new court at Washington for the hearing of administrative appeals. The association's
committee of 1936 had not put forward such a court as a definitive proposal on its part but had merely discussed such proposal in its report,
and a bill for the creation of such a court was then pending in Congress
though not sponsored by the committee. After the action taken at Boston, the committee earnestly considered ways and means of providing
review, but neither too little review nor too much, neither concentrated
at Washington nor too scattered, and the proposal I have already outlined was the result of our deliberations.
The first requisite of a review, as the committee saw it, was the
compilation of a record on which such a review could be based. The
idea of a right of trial de novo in the district courts of the United States,
or any other court, of all the myriad cases arising in the conduct of governmental affairs, was obviously out of the question. It was necessary
to have a record made somewhere in the course of the administrative
process itself, before the case ever reached the courts. In the case of the
principal -boards and commissions this of course presented no problem;
those commissions have their hearings and make up their records in a
perfectly natural way. But there are any number of administrative
decisions in the federal departments that are made by an individual, or
by a group of individuals, with perhaps some re-examination by a higher
officer and final approval by the head of the department, but with no
method whatever for the citizen affected by such decision to present
his case in an orderly way or even to know what reports and confidential
memoranda constitute the basis of the decision. To 'bring these cases
out into the open and give the citizen a fair chance to build up a record,
we provided in our bill that each head of a department must create a
necessary number of intra-departmental boards located in various parts
of the United States, and that one of these boards shall hear any person
aggrieved by any decision of an officer or employee of the department,
and shall make findings of fact and a written decision based upon the
testimony and exhibits presented before the board. The members of
the board are to be persons alread employed in the department, and its
chairman must be an attorney. As a matter of fact, we found that such
boards are already in existence in most of the departments, operating
under executive orders or in some other more or less extra-legal manner, and the provisions of our bill merely serve to legalize these boards
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and make their proceedings and the evidence on which they make their
decisions a matter of public record.
We further provided in our bill that the decisions of these boards
should be subject to the approval, disapproval or modification of the
head of the department, for, after all, it would not do to strip the department head of the power to run his own department, and make his decisions subject to the veto of a committee of his subordinates. On this
feature of the bill we were criticized by our opponents on the ground
that we were creating utterly subservient and rubber-stamp boards
which naturally would do nothing to offend the head of the department.
Our answer was that the purpose of these boards was, first, to offer
an opportunity for compiling a record as thorough and complete as the
skill of the complainant's attorney could make it, and second, to permit
the department itself to review its acts in the light of the aggrieved
person's full presentation of his case, with resultant correction (we
thought) of many errors and injustices that otherwise would never be
discovered. We operated on the principle that the responsible people
in the departments are in the main desirous of doing justice and are
neither incompetent nor unduly biased, and that by the method which
we propose many errors will be corrected right in the department, without any necessity for resort to the courts. But if that theory fails in
any particular case, the intra-departmental boards will still be valuable
as constituting a forum in which the aggrieved person may perfect his
record for presentation to the courts.
Another alternative would be the creation of a single new administrative body to hear appeals from all the departments and boards. It
was argued that such an outside body, unconnected with any of the
departments, would provide a much more independent and unbiased review of the facts and the law than we could ever expect to get from
our intra-departmental boards. We gave that suggestion very serious
consideration, but here again we were overwhelmed -by the vastness of
the field to be covered. A single board large enough and wise enough
to sit in review on all the devious activities of the federal departments
in their daily operations from Florida to Alaska would have to be one
of the most remarkable bodies ever created by man. We did not think
it could be done. Aside from the tremendous volume of work, we did
not think that such a board, giving its attention today to the inspection
of a shipload of salmon and tomorrow to the sufficiency of a contractor's
performance of a government dam contract, and the next day to an
order for the deportation of an alien, could ever acquire the education
necessary to render competent decisions upon the facts of all the different situations in which our Government interests itself, to say nothing
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of the vast expense of maintaining such a board and the clogging of the
administrative process that might result from its activity.
So we adhered to our idea of intra-departmental boards instead of a
large outside board of administrative review. We then provided that
the final determinations of these intra-departmental boards, as modified
perhaps by the head of the department, should be subject to review by
the circuit court of appeals of the circuit in which the aggrieved party
resides; the review being confined to questions of law and to the limited
examination of the facts that I have already mentioned, merely to ascertain whether the decision is unsupported by any evidence or is based on
arbitrary or capricious findings. By this type of review we accomplished several things. First, we brought the review "back home" into
the part of the country where the aggrieved party resides; secondly, we
placed the review in a constitutional court whose judges are protected
by life tenure, instead of in a legislative court of the type which Congress can create and abolish at will; and third, we gave the court an
opportunity to look into the record sufficiently to see whether the finding was an honest and permissible one, without reqairing the court to
turn itself into a super-administrator and redetermine intricate matters
already passed upon by experts. If our bill becomes a law, the circuit
court of appeals will have jurisdiction to correct serious injustices, to
remedy flagrant abuses of power even though supported by some evidence; but, on the other hand, these courts will not be swamped with
compulsory examinations of large records and the weighing of nicely
balanced testimony.
I should also mention one other feature of our proposed bill, which
met with little opposition at the convention, and which I believe represents a real advance in the interest of good citizens everywhere. That
is a provision requiring each department to implement the statutes which
it is called upon to administer, by adopting rules and regulations for the
purpose of filling in the details of the statute, with a further provision
that any person who in good faith orders his conduct in accordance with
such rules and regulations shall not be penalized for so doing so long as
the regulation remains in effect. If it is repealed or held invalid by a
court, notice of such action must be published in the Federal Register,
and the immunity period for persons conforming to such regulation will
expire thirty days after the publication. We further provided in the bill
that the validity of these rules and regulations might be tested by a proceeding in the court of claims. These provisions were intended to
answer the longing of the honest business man for some way of knowing
whether a proposed course of conduct will accord with or violate the
law. It is the accepted practice, in the enactment of regulatory statutes,
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to confine the statute to broad requirements, such as that a rate must be
"reasonable" or a practice must be "fair" or a structure must be "safe."
It is left to the administrative body to determine what is reasonable or
fair or safe, or, as it is often put, to fill in the details of the statute.
Our bill would require this "filling-in" to be done explicitly and in writing, and would protect the citizen who acts in good faith under the
regulation while it is in force. And the citizen who thinks that a regulation does not conform to the authorizing statute is given the right to
contest it in a court, not as to any question of policy or wisdom, but as
to its conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. We think the enactment of this portion of our bill would be of
great benefit to business men and their counsel, who have the somewhat
precarious job of making their business conduct conform to broadly
and sometimes loosely worded federal statutes.
I have given an outline of the present status of the effort for improvement in the federal field in this matter of administrative review,
and in the earlier portion of this paper I suggested also the desirability
of an improved system of review in the states. On the federal side,
real action is about to be taken, presumably at the next session of Congress. As to the states, perhaps the suggested improvements, or any
improvements at all, will not be carried into effect for a long time.' I do
believe, however, that the subject is one of such rapidly growing importance as to warrant the earnest thought of all of us.

